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Illusory identities and cultural
hybridity among the “Sinoi” on
Reunion Island
Between twenty and twenty-five thousand of the population are
descendants of Cantonese or Hakka Chinese
Live Yu-Sion
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall
1 Today, most of the Chinese descendants on Reunion have lost the central elements of
their  ancestral  culture  and  no  longer  speak  Cantonese  or  Hakka.  In  this  article  I
propose to examine the question of cultural hybridity and the “return to our roots”
among the  Chinese descendants on Reunion, in connection with the problem of ethnic
and cultural identity within a Creole society which has been mixed since its inception.
On Reunion, actual social structures and interrelations are constantly traversed by a
quest  for  underlying  cultural  identities.  The  latter  are  more  a  consequence  of
perception or accepted representations than of any grounding  in reality, since all the
different groups on the island have lost their ancestral language and culture over the
last  two,  three  or  four  generations.  Their  current  Creole  names,  Sinoi (Chinese),
Malabars (Tamils),  Z’arabs (Muslims of Indian descent),  Cafres (Madagascan Africans),
Yabs (poor whites),  Gro-blan (prosperous whites) have very few xenophobic or racist
overtones; they are simply a legacy of colonial history within popular speech.
2 So what motives could lie behind the quest for identity, and what is the meaning of a
“return to  our  roots”  among the  Sinoi,  who call  themselves  and see  themselves  as
Chinese in every respect?1 To begin to outline an answer to this question, it is necessary
to recapitulate briefly the history of the Chinese immigrants to the island, and to give
an  account  of  their  social  and  cultural  organization.  In  addition,  a  greater
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understanding of this quest for “roots” is helped by considering the developments in
the island’s social and political context over the last two or three decades.
3 The  island  of  Reunion  is  situated  in  the  southwest  area  of  the  Indian  Ocean,  880
kilometres east of Madagascar. It was uninhabited at the time of its discovery by the
Portuguese in the early sixteenth century. Although it became a French possession in
1642, it was only permanently settled after 1663. At first it was called Bourbon Island,
but changed its  name to Reunion in 1793,  after  the French Revolution.  In 1946,  its
status was changed from colony to overseas French département 2. Over its history of
three and a half centuries, successive waves of migrants have settled there, these made
up of settlers,  colonialists,  slaves,  indented labourers,  merchants,  etc.,  from Europe,
Africa, Madagascar, the Comores Islands, Asia and the Americas. At present, its mixed
multiethnic and multicultural population amounts to 700,000 inhabitants.
A brief history and survey of the social organization of the Chinese on Reunion
4 The history of the Chinese on the island is well known in its broad outlines 3. It was
characterised by two kinds of immigration: contractual and so-called “free”.
Contractual immigration
5 Contractual immigration began a few years before the abolition of slavery on Reunion
in 1848. The turn to foreign labour to replace the slaves on the plantations was the
main  motive  behind  the  recruitment  of  indentured  Chinese  workers.  The  first
contingent of these workers arrived from Malaya, and not directly from China, in 1844.
These men were intended to work on the land, on building dykes and banks, or in grain
production. But in 1846, the colonial government halted the recruitment of Chinese,
considering them to be “bad workers” following a number of revolts and other acts of
violence by a number. Living and working conditions on the plantations were hardly
any different from those borne by the Madagascan and African slaves, since the main
motives of the masters or the plantation owners were profits at any price.
 
Chinese Population size
Sources: 1848-1860: ADR 6 M, Population et Statistiques and De la Barre de Nanteuil, Législation de
l’île de la Réunion, Editions Donnaud, Paris, 1861, p. 388, 1865-1896 : Annuaires de l’île de la Réunion ;
1902-1941 : ADR 6 M, 1296, Population et Statistiques, and censuses.
6 In 1901, a second attempt to make use of a shipment of 808 Chinese from Fuzhou in
China,  met  with  the  same  failure  as  the  first.  The  Chinese  refused  to  accept  the
conditions of virtual slavery. They denounced their plantation bosses’ failure to honour
the terms of their contracts and the harsh conditions which they imposed. Nearly all of
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them left  the island in 1907,  as  a  consequence  of  the disturbances they caused on
various plantations.
7 These first two waves of immigration provide little by way of sociological interest for
the study of ethnic Chinese on the island, however, since most of them left at the end of
their contracts, and some even before. The present day Sinoi are the result of twentieth-
century Chinese immigration.
Free immigration
8 The so-called free Chinese immigration to Reunion began after a law was passed in
1862, which allowed any foreigner to take up employment there. Every year several
hundred Chinese from the southern provinces (Guangdong) left their home villages for
Reunion (see insert).  Between 1920 and 1940 their numbers steadily rose to several
thousand and over. Some came to rejoin their families, while others were driven by
events  like  the  Sino-Japanese  war  (see  insert).  In  1946,  the  laws and  regulations
concerning immigration into metropolitan France became applicable to Reunion, which
had  become  an  overseas  French  département.  After  1950,  Chinese  immigration
practically  ceased,  because  of  the  closure  of  China’s  borders.  At  present,  the  great
majority of Chinese on  the island are descended from the voluntary migrants, and not
from the indentured workers of the nineteenth century.
Language groups
9 There are only two Chinese language groups on the island, Cantonese and Hakka. The
Cantonese were the first to arrive, beginning in 1880, from the villages around the city
of Guangzhou, Nanhai, Shunde and Shajiao. They generally settled in the northern part
of  the  island,  in  Saint-Denis,  Saint-André  and  Saint-Benoît.  However,  around  1850,
other Cantonese immigrants began to arrive from Mauritius 4.
10 The first Hakkas arrived from Meixian or Mauritius from the second half of the 1880s. A
few  years  later,  more  arrived  from  the  French  territories  of  South-East  Asia
(Indochina).  They  settled  in the  south  of  the  island  (Saint-Pierre  and  Le  Tampon),
probably because of the commercial rivalry and long-standing divisions between them
and the Cantonese.
Population size
11 The Chinese represent a very small percentage of the overall population on Reunion. In
the nineteenth century, there were less than a thousand, but between 1900 and 1950
the figures rose from 1,000 to 4,000. However, the frequency of migratory movements
between  Mauritius,  Reunion,  the  Seychelles  and  Madagascar  prevents  any  precise
assessment. Currently the “Chinese” population of the island is reckoned at between
twenty and twenty-five thousand. But exactly who counts as Chinese on Reunion?
The uneven proportion of Chinese women and men
12 Reunion  provides  yet  another  example  of  a  characteristic  specific  to  Chinese
emigration overseas. At the beginning there was generally a disproportionate number
of men and women. Just as in France 5 or elsewhere, such as Madagascar 6, Tahiti 7 or
Mauritius 8, the majority of the early immigrants were men alone, with their wives only
joining them a few years later. The first Chinese women reached Reunion in 1864, but
there were only nine of them. From 1864 to 1902, their number never rose above a
hundred. It was only after 1920 that numbers took off: 105 in 1921, 277 in 1926, 466 in
1931, 616 in 1936, and 1,183 in 1941 9. Before the Second World War, the distance from
their native land inhibited their relocation to the island, owing to the risks and high
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cost of sea travel. In addition, the weight of tradition in China offered few incentives
for Chinese women to emigrate, since their departure would deprive the family of its
chances for having descendants, threatening it with the disappearance of its lineage.
The different Chinese social groups
13 The historical record of Chinese immigration to Reunion enables us to make a current
distinction between five separate groups of Chinese or Sinoi, to use the Creole term for
people of Chinese descent 10. 
14 The first group consists of immigrants who were born in China. They speak Chinese,
with  a  bit  of  Creole  and  a  smattering  of  French.  They  form  a  small  minority  of
immigrants  who  have  been  there  since  the  inter-war  years  (1920-1940).  They  are
mostly restaurant owners and shopkeepers, because commerce was at that time one of
the quickest means of economic and social integration.
15 The second group consists of their descendants born before 1945, who were educated
and brought up in Reunion society but with little exposure to the French educational
system. In many cases, they attended a Chinese school, and they have assimilated some
aspects of Chinese and Creole culture but little by way of French culture. They have a
poor  command  of  French,  but  they  speak  Chinese  and  Creole  fluently  and  do  not
experience any deep sense of crisis in cultural identity. Some of them took over the
family business after the death of their father, while others  entered various firms on
the island as salaried employees or labourers. Since the 1970s, the social and economic
changes on Reunion have led to a rise in their standard of living. Year by year, the
Chinese shops have turned into more spacious and modern businesses like self-services
or mini-marts.
16 The third group consists of those born after the 1950s and educated in French. They no
longer speak Chinese, apart from a few phrases, and only use Creole to talk to their
parents or their immediate circle. Most of them underwent higher education in France
in the 1960s and 1970s, and have entered the liberal professions (as doctors, dentists,
architects, lawyers, etc.),  the large private firms (as accountancy experts, engineers,
traders),  or  the  public  sector  (as  administrators,  and  teachers).  Their  feelings  of
belonging to the Chinese community remain relatively strong. This generation is to a
great extent assimilated into French culture, but for about twenty years they have been
trying to “get  back to their  roots” through an attempted re-appropriation of  some
salient aspects of Chinese culture (courses in the Chinese language, calligraphy, tai chi,
qigong, and Chinese cooking). This group experiences moments of identity crisis.
17 The fourth group is composed of young people born after 1975. This generation is the
most integrated into French or Western cultural patterns. Nonetheless, some of them
are attempting a return to their Chinese cultural identity (trips to China for recreation
or  study,  Chinese  language  courses,  martial  arts  training,  a   taste  for  Hong  Kong
cinema). Their sense of belonging to the Chinese “community” is also relatively strong.
But some of them totally reject their Chinese origins and culture, without any major
identity crisis.
18 The last group consists of people of mixed descent who no longer have any knowledge
of the Chinese language or culture. This hybridity, recent or not, of a fringe sector of
the Chinese population is noticeable above all in the physical appearance of different
individuals.  It  can  happen  that  their  dominant  physical  characteristics  do  not
correspond to their Chinese surnames. A person from Reunion with a Chinese surname
may look like a Creole, a Madagascan, a Tamil, or a Caucasian. Quite a number within
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this group, at a certain point in their lives, try to rediscover their Chinese origins (by
setting up associations, travelling to their ancestral villages, organising or joining in
traditional  feasts,  regularly  visiting  pagodas,  reading  Chinese  stories  in  Creole
translation, etc.).
The formation of a Chinese cultural identity
19 The process whereby the multicultural identity of the Chinese, or rather the Sinoi, has
been formed only affects those generations born on Reunion, since the first generation
were born and raised in China,  only coming to the island as adults.  This formative
process  involves  the  assimilation of  several  cultural  elements  whose  provenance  is
partly Creole, partly Chinese and partly French, so the identity of these islanders of
Chinese descent is actually tricultural. The multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural
social context gives rise to a culture of hybridisation which is apparent everywhere,
whether in cultural creations like music, buildings, art and literature, or in institutions,
implements, artefacts, etc. Hybridisation is a process of adoption, appropriation and
remoulding of  disparate  cultural  elements  11.  It  only  takes  root  in  certain  kinds  of
society  or  environment.  Caught  up  in  a  permanent  confrontation  of  different
languages, beliefs and philosophies, the cultural interplay on Reunion is a long-term
mechanism of  acquisition,  integration  and  acculturation  of  certain  elements  which
become  reformulated,  reinterpreted  and  redefined  to  give  rise  to  a  new  identity.
However,  as  Laplantine  and Nouss  point  out,  hybridisation “is  not  manifested  in  a
constant  or  consistent  fashion,  but  develops  through  slippages  and  alternation.
Hybridisation is detectable in movements of inner tension and patterns of resonance
and oscillation, finding expression through provisional forms organised in alternative
ways”.  This  non-linear  movement  “is  a  trajectory  which  advances  in  spirals,
enveloping,  developing,  redeploying  and  above  all  displacing,  the  components  of
literature, music, cooking and languages ... from one cultural space to another” 12.
The Creole component
20 The cultural identity developed by generations of Chinese born on the island must be
seen in its particular social context. This was characterised by a relatively long period
of isolation, since Reunion was somewhat “forgotten” by metropolitan France during
the first three centuries of its existence (from 1663 to 1965). Until the late 1960s, it
remained underdeveloped. There was little in the way of schools, hospitals or public
housing, and the road system was very limited and largely without tarmac. The health
levels on the island were low, and infectious diseases like malaria continued to afflict a
considerable portion of the population. This situation began to improve from the 1970s,
with the introduction of free medical care, social security and the establishment of the
Departmental Directorate for Health and Social Affairs (DDASS). The long isolation due
to distance provided the context in which different cultures from all over the world
could meet, exchange and intermingle.  This interpenetration of languages, religions
and  philosophies  gave  birth  to  a  hybridity  which  nowadays  has  acquired  its  own
identity. The island’s Creole is the outcome of a linguistic brew of French with African,
Asian  and  Madagascan  languages.  It  has  become  the  mother  tongue  of  all  the
inhabitants, the lingua franca of the large majority of the population, with the exception
of the new arrivals from metropolitan France.
21 All the generations of Chinese born on the island are steeped in Creole culture, despite
certain claims to the contrary. This is because society puts forward cultural models,
defining norms and values which the individual interiorises from the moment of his
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birth. In a multiethnic and multicultural society, an individual identifies with several
groups, considering himself a member of them all as a given fact, but at the same time
he feels different from the other members of these groups, when they call themselves
Chinese, Tamil, Madagascan or whatever. In short, the individual is caught up in the
dialectic of self and other. This also involves a reciprocal articulation of the factors of
permanence and change. The development of Chinese identity follows this evolutionary
process,  progressively  moulding  and modifying  itself,  and  adopting  different  forms
throughout  its  existence  in  response  to  the  events  and  disruptions  in  the  social,
political, cultural, or economic life of the island. In short, the Chinese, or rather the
Sinoi cultural identity develops in accordance with the transformations affecting the
whole of society on the island.
The Chinese component
22 Apart  from the fundamental  role  played by the Chinese family  in  the education of
children,  the  social  and  cultural  organization  of  the  Chinese  rests  on  community
institutions,  such as associations,  places of worship and schools.  Their first cultural
associations were set up by the Cantonese in 1877 in Saint-Denis. These were of two
types.  One was based on the clan principle,  meaning that  they were frequented by
individuals bearing the same clan name and coming from the same home district. The
others  were  regionally  based,  bringing together  migrants  from the  same village  or
home district who were not from the same clan 13. Formerly, these  associations played
a  role  in  preserving  and  disseminating  the  cultural  heritage.  Their  activities  were
focused  on  making  the  younger  generation  aware  of  Chinese  culture  through
organising language or cookery courses, traditional festivities, or encouraging people
to get together through sports like table tennis,  football  and basketball,  or through
group outings, dances or banquets.
23 The first  Chinese school  was founded in 1927 in  Saint-Denis.  But  it  closed in  1930,
because the teacher returned to China 14. The organisation of the Chinese schools was
the responsibility of the Chinese chamber of commerce which financed them through
contributions from businessmen. The schools paid teachers from Mauritius or China,
and the language of instruction was Hakka in the Hakka schools, and Cantonese in the
Cantonese schools. The Chinese schools which were set up in the inter-war period were
dissolved just after the Second World War by the colonial authorities who were trying
to  eradicate  all  cultural  characteristics  other  than  French  ones.  The  colonial
administration saw in  such schools  elements  of  cultural  separation,  and set  out  to
control them by demanding that there should be less time spent on Chinese than on
French language teaching. It was in order to comply with the new regulations that the
Chinese had to set up bilingual Franco-Chinese schools. The first of these opened in
Saint-Denis in 1942. This school and the one in Saint-André, are the best known. They
cater to about 80% of Chinese youngsters born on the island 15. After the Second World
War, with Reunion becoming an overseas département, children’s education in French
schools became compulsory. In addition, their parents saw no point in putting them
through a Chinese education, having abandoned all hope of returning to China. The
generation born in the 1950s went to French primary and secondary schools.
The French component
24 From the time of the earliest settlement up until the 1960s, French cultural influence
on the majority of the population was relatively slight, on account of the geographical
distance. It was only after Michel Debré, a native of metropolitan France, was elected as
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deputy in 1963 that there was a policy of assimilation tending to eliminate the Creole
language  and  culture.  Nevertheless,  this  political  representative  did  establish  a
development policy for the island, and created the necessary infrastructure (schools,
hospitals, roads, airports) to bring it out of its isolation.
25 Schooling was one of the instruments of this Frenchifying policy. The  elite had already
established a lycée for their children, and for a long time this institution was the only
means of social advancement for the youth of the island. For the rest of the population,
the authorities had set up junior colleges and technical schools. There were also private
schools run by religious orders. At present Reunion possesses a large number of junior
colleges and lycées, and one university serving 12,000 students. 
26 In addition, the introduction of television has brought the island into contact with the
rest  of  the world,  and opened the inhabitants’  insular outlook.  The island can now
receive several satellite channel offerings, and this has brought profound changes into
daily  life  and transformed the  islanders’  way  of  thinking.  One  consequence  of  this
inflow  of  images  from  overseas  has  been  an  identification  with  the  lifestyles  in
metropolitan France.
27 Over the last two decades, the socio-economic changes on the island have led to a rapid
evolution of society from being a typical colonial society towards becoming a consumer
society. This is evident in real facts as well as in the signs and symbols common to all
such societies: there has been a huge expansion of services and material goods, of mass
communications, and of growth in individual spending, coupled with a spread of the
myths of equal rights to the good life, etc. 16.
Cultural loss
28 The assimilation of the different components of Creole, Chinese and French culture by
the  later  generations  of  Chinese  confronts  the  third  generation  with  an  identity
problem. Its intensity varies with the individual involved, but the post-war youth share
a disquiet over their identity. Having undergone a process of veritable deculturalisation
from the 1960s to the 1980s, they are now attempting to recover their roots. In that
earlier period the Chinese language and culture were so devalued that the younger
generations were ashamed of being Chinese.
29 Now,  however,  they  are  living  out  a  paradoxical  situation.  They  acknowledge
themselves as Chinese, or of Chinese descent, and they are considered as such by the
society  of  the  island at  large, but  they have neither  Chinese  language nor  Chinese
culture. Their lingua franca is Creole, but they do not feel themselves to be Creole or
French, and they hardly ever participate in any Creole or French cultural activities. The
search for identity is not an issue for people of Chinese descent alone, for it affects the
whole post-war generation in general, who are clearly abandoning their native tongue
in  favour  of  French.  Christian  Barat  notes  that,  from  colonial  rule  to  rule  via  the
département, there is an ongoing process of assimilation into the reputedly “universal”
French  language  and  culture,  and  this  actually  imposes  an  increasing  measure  of
integration into the social, economic and cultural sphere of metropolitan France and
the West in general. This assimilation process, he writes, “brings to the islanders the
benefits of an opening onto the outer world, but at the same time it imposes on them
the  control  of  monopolies  over  the  different  means  of  communication  (from  mass
media to airlines) and their corresponding consumer models” 17. In a work published a
few years earlier, Jean Benoist had already highlighted how “the process of assimilation
has  operated  without  interruption  until  the  present  day,  and  has  induced  the
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inhabitants of Reunion to overvalue French cultural models and standards, which are
then taken as a benchmark and source for imitation, while also serving as a measure by
which other cultures must be downgraded” 18.
Back to Chinese roots
30 The return to  cultural  roots  arises  from two main causes.  The first  of  these  is  the
encounter  with  real  differences  in  metropolitan  France.  Since  the  1960s,  the  third
generation Chinese  have  been leaving to  pursue  their  university  studies  in  France,
supported either by their families or by a system of grants. This moment marked the
beginning of  the  improvement  in  the  economic  situation of  the  Chinese.  A  certain
number of families began to buy apartments in France, particularly in the fifteenth
arrondissement in Paris and in Toulouse and Marseille, partly for financial security and
partly to provide a roof over their student children’s heads. 
31 The second factor was the policy of decentralisation implemented by the Left when
François Mitterand took office in May 1981. The law on decentralisation, which was
passed on December 31st 1982, gave Reunion a collective territorial status. In other
words,  some decision-making powers were entrusted to locally elected people.  This
decentralisation helped to bring about changes in certain aspects of political, economic
and social  life:  independent radio stations,  commemoration of the 1848 abolition of
slavery,  creation  of  the  Réunion  Academy  and  University,  etc.  This  policy  also
encouraged  the  development  of  Tamil,  Chinese,  Comoran,  Madagascan  and  Breton
societies ... who all proclaimed their right to a distinct identity and a return to their
roots.  In  the  words  of  one  of  my  informants,  “On  their  return  from  their  higher
education in France in the 1980s, the third and fourth generation Chinese believed that
their own language and culture had been distorted by the pressure to become French.
In order to counteract  this assimilation, they went back to their “roots”, visiting their
ancestral  villages  to  meet  up  with  members  of  their  family  and  rediscover  some
traditional Chinese cultural values ....  People of the third generation, whose parents
had  rejected  their  Chineseness,  turned  back  to  Chinese  culture.  Many  have  that
aspiration.  ...  There  have  been  times  when  I  too  have  asked  myself  whether  I  am
Chinese, French or Reunionese. But to be frank, I only asked that when I was twenty,
and I don’t any more. I am in France, and I may not be like the French but, as long as
I’m accepted here, I no longer ask questions like that. Some of my friends of my age do
have a problem, though. It’s  a  kind of  intellectual  need.  Often people like that feel
rejected and can’t adapt to life in France ...”
32 This desire to recover one’s origins finds an outlet in the cultural celebrations which
the islanders of Chinese descent organise on traditional feast days like the festival of
Guandi or the Lunar New Year. The return to their “roots” is found most frequently
among young people who have studied in France. One of them, Karine, told me, “It was
in Paris that my Chinese side, my identity, came out more. In Paris there is a large
Chinese  community  that  I  don’t  feel  very  close  to.  On  the  other  hand,  in  my
professional  life,  there are many Asians,  Japanese,  Koreans,  and so forth.  But  what
made me more aware of my Chinese identity was the way other people looked at me,
and their  questions,  like  ‘Who are  you?  Where  do  you come from? Can you speak
Chinese?’. And who were these other people? They weren’t only the French, but also
the Koreans, the Taiwanese, the Japanese, the Germans, the Italians ... the people I work
with”.
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33 However, the Chinese “community” is prevented from becoming truly Chinese again by
its unfamiliarity with the real meanings of all the Chinese cultural references, due to its
assimilation of French and Creole values. So the cultural activities mentioned above
remain  purely  episodic.  Furthermore,  daily  life  is  carried  on  in  the  context  of
Reunionese, not Chinese society. The will to become Chinese again turns out to be an
illusion. This desire to enrich their Chinese linguistic and cultural heritage through a
recovery of their origins has produced no positive results. At the same time, within the
context of the hybridity which characterises the whole of Creole society, the issue of
Chinese cultural  origins  remains in  many ways rather  problematical.  The quest  for
origins is directed towards a largely mythical territory, because the China of the 1930s
and  1940s,  which  their  parents  or  grandparents  knew  before  leaving,  has  now
disappeared. As Michel A. H. told me, “All my family members who have had a bit of
free time have visited China at least once or twice. But they have realised that the
China of their parents no longer has anything to do with them, that the differences are
too big. For most of them, their lost dream was that of an individual from our Creole
and French culture. They no longer feel any real sense of contact with Chinese culture”.
Intercultural contacts via the look of others
34 In the field of  intercultural  contacts,  the question of  individual  ethnic and cultural
origins is a constant factor, inasmuch as it is the phenotype, that is to say the physical
features, which allows the individual to be recognised as belonging to one group or
another. The family name also serves, together with the colour of eyes and skin, and
the type of hair,  as a sign of membership of a particular group. The inhabitants of
Reunion  identify  themselves,  and  make  the  corresponding  distinctions  between
themselves,  through  such  socially  established  representations.  In  contemporary
speech, there are seven such different groups.
35 The French from metropolitan France are called the Zoreils. They have earned this label
because, when they are still  new arrivals and are addressed in Creole,  they tend to
strain forward with their ears (les oreilles), trying to understand. The Tamils are called
the Malabars through a misunderstanding, because they were thought to have come
from the Malabar coast (to work in the plantations). The Gujerati from India are called
the Z’arabes because they are Muslims (having settled as merchants on the island since
1870).  The  mixed  race  people  of  African  origin  are  called  Cafres.  They  are  the
descendants of slaves from Mozambique, Guinea, Senegal, or Madagascar, but not from
Caffraria in South Africa. The white Creoles make up the population of European origin
and are subdivided into two groups: the Gro-Blan are the former owners of the sugar
plantations, and the Yab are the poor whites who settled in the Hauts de la Réunion
area. The Chinese are called Sinoi in Creole, and this term serves a meaningful function,
since it enables a distinction to be made between the Chinese (Chinois) from China and
those who were born and raised on the island. 
36 All  these  assignments  of  ethnic  identity  are  the  products  of  looking.  To  give  an
individual a name which both particularises and classifies is an essential stage in the
way the islanders are assigned to a particular group. This naming is closely linked to
another aspect of identity, namely the one which determines his ethnic, rather than his
cultural group identity. But while ethnic identity is perceived in terms of a person’s
hereditary traits, it is also expressed through a range of signs and symbols, including
the family name, which are acquired at birth. The family name is both a sign, a marker
of origins, and a symbol of filial descent. It functions both to classify the individual’s
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identity and to attach it to a lineage, but it also anchors it to a region, a country, and
hence to a social status.
37 In order to clarify their geographical provenance, overseas Chinese often refer to the
town or village where they or their ancestors were born. The family clan’s place of
origin is a basic factor. According to Norbert Elias, the family name is for the individual
“both the outward symbol of his uniqueness and the means whereby he answers the
question of who he is,  in his own eyes and in the eyes of others” 19.  The individual
acquires  membership  of  a  particular  lineage  or  territorial  group  through  certain
distinguishing attributes (names, or other external signs) and these become the marks
of his identity, notably in the form of an attachment to a particular territory or cultural
formation,  thus  becoming  the  definitive  agencies  in  ethnic  and  cultural  identity
formation.
38 The following personal statement shows, however, that this general schema does not
always fit the reality on Reunion: “My grandmother is a Creole of mixed Cafre (Afro-
Madagascan) and Malabar (Tamil) ancestry. My father was much lighter skinned and
did not have Chinese eyes. My sister is very light-skinned, and she has a light-skinned
daughter  who  does  have  Chinese  eyes.  As  my  sister’s  complexion  is  so  light,  her
children are practically white. My brother has Chinese eyes and slightly Cafre hair. But I
have Chinese hair, but not Chinese eyes. So all of us children have a bit of Chineseness,
in our eyes, hair or skin. My mother is a Cafre (Afro-Madagascan) in appearance. As for
me, I have two children. My son has a face like mine, but a slightly lighter complexion.
My aunt  has  four  children―three girls  and a  boy.  One of  the girls  has  turned out
completely Chinese, with straight hair ... One evening, in a family gathering there were
only Chinese there, I mean, everyone looked Chinese, except me. There were also three
girls who looked rather more Creole, of the yab (poor white) sort. Talking it over then,
we wondered about our origins and realised that we shared Chinese origins. There was
also somebody there who went to school with me, and to look at him you’d say he was a
yab, but he had a Chinese family name.”
39 The operative  perceptual  schema here  characterises  an individual  according to  the
stereotypes,  prejudices,  and  normalising  expectations  fixed  by  society.  These
identifying attributes belong to the realm of social representations. But often they do
not  correspond  to  an  individual’s  actual   cultural  identity.  The  Norwegian
anthropologist, Fredrik Barth was the first to propose that we give up analysing ethnic
questions in terms of a group’s ethnic, cultural or historical features 20, since ethnic and
cultural  identity―which  some  writers call  ethnicity―are  not  fixed  and  unchanging
facts, but dynamic processes which undergo transformations. Barth is more concerned
with the forms of group organisation than with their culture and its correlates, which
invariably include paradoxes and inconsistencies. In his view, the culture of a group is
secondary, and it does not constitute an essential element defining its identity. Instead,
he invokes the symbolic demarcations between groups, which he calls ethnic boundaries.
Groups  construct  these  boundaries,  and  then  raise  them  as  barriers,  to  mark
themselves out as different from other groups. In other words, they define themselves
through their relationship to others: “Ethnic distinctions ... are the consequence of the
phenomena  of  assignment  and  attribution,  through  which  groups,  related
oppositionally to other groups, define and proclaim their own identity” 21. Insofar as an
ethnic group recognises an individual as a member, and the individual feels himself to
be a member, his identity will turn out to be characteristic of the group. Barth points
Illusory identities and cultural hybridity among the “Sinoi” on Reunion Island
China Perspectives, 49 | september-october 2003
10
out that the role of “ethnic leaders” in mobilising and laying claim to group identities
should not be forgotten. In his view, such leaders may be aiming at the politicisation of
group identity, which often has nothing to do with the popular will and culture of the
groups  themselves.  This  thesis  is  borne  out  by  the  behaviour  and  the  attitudes  of
people of Chinese descent on Reunion. 
40 The  permanent  contact  and  daily  social  interchange  between the  third  and  fourth
generation Chinese and the other “ethnic” groups on Reunion have created a cultural
hybridity which is the cultural basis of society on the island. This means that there are
no truly distinct ethno-cultural communities there. About twenty years before Barth’s
observations,  Robert  Chaudenson  had  already  drawn  attention  to  this  cultural
hybridity when he wrote that “the process of group integration ... goes back so far, and
was so rapid and wide-ranging that it is now more or less impossible to detect a clear-
cut identity in any group whatsoever, in terms of either ethnicity or anything else. The
only  exceptions  to  this  are  the  very  small  minority  of  homogeneous  communities
composed of recent immigrants, such as the Chinese, or Muslims from India” 22. I can
only partly agree with this view, because the Chinese and the Indian Muslims in no way
constitute  “communities”  in  the  sociological  sense  23,  and  still  less  “homogeneous
communities”. The ethnic group names in place (cafres, malabars, zoreils, yab, sinoi ...) are
the products of established ways of looking. They are the result of mental constructions
of  difference and have nothing to do with the social  realities  of  the ethno-cultural
groups on the island. Cultural practices like the traditional feasts (Guandi, Lunar New
Year, Dipavali) are potential seeds from which an identity is made to appear. They are
perceived as means for the cultural production of the ethnicity of this or that group.
41 Nowadays  the  so-called  cultural  associations  are  no  longer  institutions  for  the
preservation and dissemination of Chinese culture, as the pre-war associations were.
Their  activities  are  limited  to  organising  outings  (tours,  picnics,  restaurant  visits),
setting  up  courses  in  Mandarin  (whereas  the  great  majority  of  the  Chinese
“community” are of Hakka or Cantonese origin), or encouraging social contacts among
the  younger  generation  through  dances  and  banquets.  In  a  predominantly  Creole,
hybridised  social  context,  cultural  references  proliferate  everywhere,  blurring  the
outlines  of  the  original  ethnic  and cultural  identities,  which then become purely  a
matter of interpretation. So these references become elements which sustain a purely
illusory sense of identity. The supposed state of belonging to a world of Chinese culture
has  no  connection  with  reality,  and  is  nothing  but  an  empty  fantasy.  Creole  still
remains  the  lingua  franca  of  these  Chinese,  being  the  language  in  which  they
communicate  most  naturally  in  their  day-to-day  life.  The  most  obvious  cultural
elements of their plural identity are the languages which they use everyday (Creole,
French, as well as Chinese). So their identity is likewise multicultural. To be Chinese in
a Creole society is to belong to two, or even three, cultural worlds (Chinese, French and
Creole).
42 The “return to cultural roots” with its turning back to origins, is partly linked to a
resistance to the policy of French assimilation on the one hand, and to the merging into
Creole on the other. It is a response to the devaluation of the Chinese cultural view of
the world. Some of its adherents consider that Creole culture cannot equal the prestige
of Chinese culture, which they see as remarkable for its depth and its antiquity. So for
them hybridity represents a loss of identity and worth. 
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43 For  a  small  fringe  of  the  Chinese  “community”,  such  hostile  reactions  and  violent
opposition to their surroundings indirectly express their pain (often very close to the
surface)  at  living  amidst  several  cultural  milieux.  Such  reactions  reveal  an  inner
suffering,  which  is  full  of  paradoxes  and  contradictions,  but  which  is  one  of  the
consequences of all the expression of concern with identity since the mid-1980s (the
policy of French assimilation is another). Meanwhile, however, those in pursuit of this
“quest” for origins are in reality right in the middle of the Creole society to which they
actually  belong.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Barth’s  reflections  on  “ethnic  leaders”  is
applicable to the analysis of the Sinoi which I am presenting here.
44 As a  post-colonial  multicultural  society,  Reunion is  still  partly  living in its  colonial
inheritance, and it is not free of the stereotypes and old prejudices shared by all the
islanders,  whether  of  Chinese,  Tamil,  Gujerati,  Madagascan,  Comorian  or  European
origin. This multiculturalism deserves greater attention, but that has not been the aim
of  this  article.  Here  I  have approached the question of  the  identity  of  the  Chinese
descendants  on Reunion in terms of  their  interrelationship with the ways that  the
other groups on this island in the Indian Ocean have also constructed their identity. 
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